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1 Introduction
In matters of conflict, players frequently evaluate situations on the basis of several criteria. Still,
games with multiple criteria and in particular cooperative games with multiple criteria have
received relatively little attention in game theoretic literature. Some exceptions are Bergstresser
and Yu (1977) and Lind (1996).
In the current paper, we introduce a new class of cooperative multicriteria games. Two
fundamentally dierent types of criteria are considered: private criteria and public criteria.
Private or divisible criteria share the characteristics of the criterion one usually works with when
studying games with transferable utility, the characteristics of money: the amount obtained can
be divided over coalition members so that one member consumes a dierent quantity than
another member, and that which is consumed by one member cannot be consumed by another.
In economic terms, these criteria are rival and excludable. Public or indivisible criteria have the
same value for all members of a coalition; they are non-rival and non-excludable. Examples of
such criteria are global warming, investment in medical research, or, on a dierent scale, the
national rate of unemployment and its eect on the economy, political stability, and the safety
in your country.
The introduction of public criteria is new to cooperative game theory, presumably because
it is assumed that some central authority takes a (socially optimal) decision on such criteria.
However, the value of a public criterion is often influenced by decisions made on private criteria
by individual agents (think of pollution levels, for example). Hence, it seems that decisions on
private and public criteria should not be treated separately. An integrated view on private and
public criteria might expose the trade-os faced by individuals not only between criteria in the
same category, but also between criteria in dierent categories.
The ‘value’ of a coalition is usually interpreted as that which its members can guarantee
themselves by joining forces. If multiple criteria are involved, then improvement in one criterion
(number of sh caught) may well have detrimental eects on other criteria (environmental
issues like biodiversity). So, the relative importance of dierent criteria plays a signicant role.
But the relative importance of two criteria may dier with their values. For example, rich
countries attach relatively more importance to controlling pollution levels than to increasing
production since production levels and pollution levels are already high. For developing countries
with low production levels, however, increasing production is more important than controlling
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pollution levels. We believe that ‘collapsing’ the dierent criteria to one number by means
of a utility function ignores some of the most interesting issues associated with multicriteria
decision situations. By leaving the dierent criteria in their own right, one can investigate what
kind of trade-os players face between the criteria. Moreover, such an approach respects the
incommensurability of some attributes: in many cases agents may be incapable of or morally
opposed against aggregating the value of money and the value of | for instance | a human life
to a common scale. In cooperative multicriteria games we therefore consider it natural to assign
a set of vector values to each coalition, i.e., we consider characteristic correspondences instead
of single valued characteristic functions and an obtainable ‘value’ is a vector that species the
value of all the criteria for a particular alternative that is feasible to a coalition.
Cooperative multicriteria games with private and public criteria as dened and studied in
the current paper generalize the games used in Bergstresser and Yu (1977) and Lind (1996).
These authors do not discriminate between several types of criteria; they only use what we call
private criteria. Moreover, the characteristic functions in their games are single-valued instead
of set-valued.
After dening multicriteria cooperative games with private and public criteria, the obvious
next step is the search for reasonable solutions to such games. This paper concentrates on core
concepts, which rule out those outcomes which are in a sense unstable because subcoalitions of
agents are able to reach agreements that are better for all their members. Taking into account
the features of the model, the distinction between private and public criteria and the introduction
of set-valued characteristic functions, we dene two concepts: the dominance outcome core and
the core.
Well-known axiomatizations of core concepts for single-criterion cooperative games (see Peleg
(1985, 1986, 1987)) use a consistency or reduced game property. The consistency principle
essentially means that if the grand coalition of players reaches an agreement, then no subcoalition
of players has an incentive to renegotiate within the coalition after giving the players outside
the coalition their part of the solution, because the proposed agreement is also a part of the
solution of the reduced game played within the subcoalition.
The current paper investigates consistency properties of the proposed core for cooperative
multicriteria games. We provide three axiomatic characterizations of the core that are based on
the notion of consistency. One of these characterizations uses converse consistency, a property
that postulates that a proposed agreement must be in the solution of a game if for every sub-
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coalition it holds that the restriction of this agreement to the subcoalition is in the solution of
the reduced game. A second axiomatization of the core uses a converse consistency requirement
that restricts attention to subcoalitions of two players. The two axiomatizations of the core
of cooperative multicriteria games that use converse consistency properties are similar to the
axiomatizations of core concepts for cooperative games with or without transferable utility by
Peleg (1985, 1986, 1987).
The third axiomatization of the core provided in this paper diers signicantly from the
previous two. It uses a new denition of reduced games, one that stresses the fact that there
are players outside each subcoalition that cannot be ignored altogether by requiring players in
a subcoalition to cooperate with at least one outside player. Consistency with respect to this
new denition of reduced games is used to give an axiomatic characterization of the core for
multicriteria games with an enlightenment property (see section 5) instead of converse consis-
tency. It is shown by means of a counterexample that this characterization does not hold if the
old denition of reduced games is used.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. Cooperative multicriteria games with private and
public criteria are dened in section 2, along with the core and the dominance outcome core.
In section 3 we prove that the dominance outcome core always contains the core and that both
concepts coincide for games satisfying some additional assumptions. In the remainder of the
paper, sections 4 and 5, we provide several axiomatizations of the core based on the notion of
consistency. In section 4 converse consistency is used to characterize the core and in section 5 we
give the new denition of reduced games that was mentioned before and use this to characterize
the core without requiring converse consistency.
2 Denitions
For vectors x; y 2 IRm, we write x >= y if xi  yi for all i = 1; : : : ; m, x  y if x
>
= y and x 6= y,
and x > y if xi > yi for all i = 1; : : : ; m. For a set A  IR
m, we dene its Pareto edge by
Par(A) := fx 2 A j there is no y 2 A with y > xg. The number of elements of a nite set A is
denoted by jAj, the collection of all of its subsets by 2A. For two subsets A and B of a vector
space V we dene A+B = fa+ b j a 2 A; b 2 Bg. For an arbitrary set A we denote by IRA the
vector space of all real-valued functions on A.
Let U be an innite set of players. A cooperative multicriteria game with public and private
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criteria, or a game for ease of notation, is described by
 A nite set D of divisible or private criteria;
 A nite set P of indivisible or public criteria;
 A nite, nonempty set N  U of players;
 A correspondence v : 2N n f;g!!IRD[P ;
such that D \ P = ;, D [ P 6= ; and v(S) 6= ; for each coalition S 2 2N n f;g. The sets D
and P that dene a certain game will not be mentioned explicitly and a game is simply denoted
(N; v). For one-person coalitions we write v(i) instead of v(fig). Let Γ denote the set of games
as dened above.
Example 2.1 Two neighbouring countries, A and B, negotiate to reduce CO2 levels in the air.
The marginal costs of reducing CO2 levels increase as abatements increase: there are relatively
cheap methods that can be used to reduce CO2 levels at rst, but to eect higher reductions,
more expensive methods have to be employed as well. Suppose country A on its own can abate
in a low-cost way by spending 100 to reduce the level of CO2 in the air by 1, and it can abate
more, a reduction of 3, at a cost of 600. Country B on its own can reduce the CO2 level by 2 at
a cost of 150 and by 7 at a cost of 900. If the countries cooperate, they can realize all the above
mentioned possibilities but also prot from each other’s expertise and abate relatively cheaper.
They can reduce CO2 levels by 3 at a cost of 200 and by 10 at a cost of 1200.
The cooperative multicriteria game describing this situation has one private criterion, minus
the cost of the abatements, and one public criterion, the decrease in the CO2 level in the air.
The player set is N = fA;Bg, the characteristic function is given by
v(A) = f(0; 0); (−100; 1); (−600; 3)g;
v(B) = f(0; 0); (−150; 2); (−900; 7)g;
v(fA;Bg) = v(A) [ v(B) [ f(−200; 3); (−1200; 10)g:
Several subsets of Γ correspond to well-known classes of games.
Example 2.2 A game (N; v) with P = ;, jDj = 1, and jv(S)j = 1 for each coalition S 2 2N nf;g
is essentially a TU-game.
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Example 2.3 A game (N; v) with P = ; and v(S) a compact and comprehensive (in the sense
that b 2 v(S) and 0 <= a
<
= b implies a 2 v(S)) subset of IR
D
+ is a multi-commodity game as
studied by van den Nouweland et al. (1989).
The characteristic function of NTU-games is also set-valued and vector-valued, but describes for
a coalition the payo for each separate member, so that the value of a coalition S is a subset
of IRS . This diers from our cooperative multicriteria games, where the correspondence v maps
the coalitions to a xed vector space IRD[P .
Cooperative multicriteria games with private and public criteria generalize the cooperative
multicriteria games used by Bergstresser and Yu (1977) and Lind (1996) in the sense that these
authors do not use set-valued characteristic functions and do not discriminate between dierent
types of criteria.
In what follows, we need a denition of an allocation. In a game (N; v) 2 Γ, an allocation
takes an element of the set of values attainable by the grand coalition N and divides it among
the players in accordance with the characteristics of the criteria: when restricted to divisible
criteria everything is divided, whereas for indivisible criteria every player gets the same xed
amount. Before formally dening allocations, some more notation is needed.
Consider a game (N; v) 2 Γ and a vector x = (xi)i2N with xi 2 IR
D[P for each i 2 N . Let
S 2 2N n f;g. Then xS denotes the vector (x
i)i2S, i.e., x restricted to the components of the
members of coalition S and x(S) denotes the sum of the elements (xi)i2S, x(S) :=
P
i2S x
i. For
a vector (or function) y 2 IRD[P the restriction of y to P is denoted yjP and the restriction of
y to D is denoted yjD.
Denition 2.4 Given a game (N; v) an allocation is a vector x = (xi)i2N with x
i 2 IRD[P for
each player i 2 N that satises the requirement that there exists a y 2 v(N ) for whichP
i2N x
i
jD = yjD and
xijP = yjP for each i 2 N:
The set of allocations of (N; v) is denoted A(N; v).
A coalition can improve upon an allocation if there is an outcome it can guarantee itself
which | when distributed over its members in a feasible way | is at least as good for each
member and better in some criterion for at least one coalition member. Formally, a coalition
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S  N can improve upon an allocation x if there exists a vector y 2 v(S) such thatP
i2S x
i
jD
<
= yjD and
xijP
<
= yjP for each i 2 S;
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). Such a vector y is said to dominate x via
S. An allocation in a game (N; v) is individually rational if one-player coalitions, i.e. individual
players, cannot improve upon it and it is an imputation if neither N nor individual players can
improve upon it. The set of individually rational allocations and the set of imputations of a
game (N; v) are denoted by IR(N; v) and I(N; v), respectively.
A solution concept  on the class Γ is a map that assigns to each game (N; v) 2 Γ a set of
allocations (N; v). Hence, (N; v) A(N; v) for all (N; v) 2 Γ.
This paper concentrates on core concepts, i.e. concepts that rule out allocations that are in
some sense unstable. We dene two dierent core concepts.
Denition 2.5 The core C(N; v) of a game (N; v) is the set of allocations upon which no
coalition can improve:
C(N; v) = fx 2 A(N; v) j there exist no S 2 2N n f;g and y 2 v(S) s.t.P
i2S x
i
jD
<
= yjD and
xijP
<
= yjP for each i 2 S
with at least one of the inequalities being strict ()g
Denition 2.6 The dominance outcome core DOC(N; v) of a game (N; v) is the set of impu-
tations for which there is no coalition S and another imputation y such that yi is better than
xi for each player i 2 S and such that the players in S can jointly guarantee themselves at least
what they get according to the allocation y:
DOC(N; v) = fx 2 I(N; v) j there exist no S 2 2N n f;g; y 2 I(N; v); and z 2 v(S) s.t.
yi  xi for each i 2 S;P
i2S y
i
jD
<
= zjD and
yijP
<
= zjP for each i 2 S g
3 Relations between the Core and the Dominance Outcome
Core
In this section we prove that the core of a game is always included in the dominance outcome
core. Moreover, we prove that the core equals the dominance outcome core under some mild
conditions.
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Proposition 3.1 For each game (N; v) 2 Γ it holds that C(N; v)  DOC(N; v).
Proof. Let (N; v) 2 Γ. If C(N; v) = ; we are done. So, assume C(N; v) 6= ; and let x =
(xi)i2N 2 C(N; v). Then
 xi 2 IRD[P for each player i 2 N and
 there exists a y 2 v(N ) such that
P
i2N x
i
jD = yjD
xijP = yjP for each i 2 N:
 Since x 2 C(N; v), neither N nor individual players can improve upon it.
Consequently, x 2 I(N; v). Now suppose x 62 DOC(N; v). Then let S 2 2N n f;g; y 2 I(N; v),
and z 2 v(S) be such that
yi  xi for each i 2 S;P
i2S y
i
jD
<
= zjD;
yijP
<
= zjP for each i 2 S:
Hence, there exist an S 2 2N n f;g; z 2 v(S) such thatP
i2S x
i
jD
<
=
P
i2S y
i
jD
<
= zjD
xijP
<
= y
i
jP
<
= zjP for each i 2 S
with at least one strict inequality since yi  xi for all i 2 S. This contradicts x 2 C(N; v). 2
In general, the core is not equal to the dominance outcome core. In the following example both
cores do not coincide.
Example 3.2 Consider a three-player, bicriteria game (N; v) where the rst criterion is divisible
and the second public. Dene v(i) = f(1; 10)g for all i 2 N and v(f1; 2g) = v(f1; 3g) =
v(f2; 3g) = v(f1; 2; 3g) = f(3; 10)g. Then I(N; v) = DOC(N; v) = f(x1; x2; x3) j x1 = x2 =
x3 = (1; 10)g. However, C(N; v) = ;, since every two-player coalition can improve upon the
unique imputation. For instance, for S = f1; 2g and y = (3; 10) 2 v(S): x11 + x
2
1 < 3 = y1 and
x12 = x
2
2 = 10 = y2.
Under some restrictions, however, the two cores coincide.
Proposition 3.3 Let (N; v) 2 Γ be a game for which the following four properties hold:
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1. Comprehensiveness of v(i) for each i 2 N and of v(N ):(
for all i 2 N and all a 2 v(i) : fx 2 IRD[P j x <= ag  v(i)
for all a 2 v(N ) : fx 2 IRD[P j x <= ag  v(N )
2. Compactness conditions:(
for all i 2 N and all a 2 v(i) : (fag+ IRD[P+ ) \ v(i) is compact
for all a 2 v(N ) : (fag+ IRD[P+ ) \ v(N ) is compact
3. Nonlevelness of v(i) for each i 2 N and of v(N ):(
for all i 2 N and all a; b 2 Par(v(i)) : if a >= b; then a = b
for all a; b 2 Par(v(N )) : if a >= b; then a = b
4. A superadditivity condition:
For each S 2 2N n f;g; y 2 v(S), and zi 2 v(i) for each i 2 N n S it holds that
if yjP
>
= z
i
jP for all i 2 N n S, then a 2 v(N ), where a 2 IR
D[P is dened as
follows:
ajD = yjD +
P
i2NnS z
i
jD
ajP = yjP
Then C(N; v) = DOC(N; v).
Remark 3.4 The denition of nonlevel sets given above is a standard denition. In the proof
of the proposition it is convenient to use the following equivalent formulation:(
for all i 2 N; all b 2 Par(v(i)); and all a 2 IRD[P : if a  b; then a 62 v(i)
for all b 2 Par(v(N )) and all a 2 IRD[P : if a  b; then a 62 v(N )
Proof (prop. 3.3). By proposition 3.1: C(N; v)  DOC(N; v). To prove that DOC(N; v) 
C(N; v), let x = (xi)i2N 2 I(N; v) and assume that x 62 C(N; v). Then there exist S 2
2N n f;; Ng and y 2 v(S) such that8<:
P
i2S x
i
jD
<
= yjD
xijP
<
= yjP for each i 2 S
(1)
where at least one inequality is strict (). For each i 2 N n S, let zi 2 v(i) be such that
zijP
<
= yjP and z
i 2 Par(v(i)), the Pareto edge of v(i). Such zi exist: let i 2 N n S and a 2 v(i),
which is possible by nonemptiness of v(i). Either ajP
<
= yjP or, using comprehensiveness of v(i),
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one can lower the coordinates in fk 2 P j ak > ykg without leaving v(i). So let b 2 v(i) be
such that bjP
<
= yjP . By assumption the set fc 2 v(i) j c
>
= bg is compact and hence the set
fc 2 v(i) j c >= b; cjP = bjPg is compact. Dene u 2 IR
D[P such that uk = 1 for k 2 D and
uk = 0 for k 2 P . By nonemptiness and compactness of fc 2 v(i) j c
>
= b; cjP = bjPg, we know
that
 := maxf 2 IR+ j b+ u 2 fc 2 v(i) j c
>
= b; cjP = bjPgg (2)
exists. We claim that b+ u 2 Par(v(i)). Suppose to the contrary, that b+ u is not on the
Pareto edge of v(i). Then d > b+u for some d 2 v(i). In particular, dk > bk+uk = bk+ for
each k 2 D. Take  = minfdk−bk j k 2 Dg. Then  >  and b+u
<
= d. By comprehensiveness
of v(i) it follows that b+u 2 v(i). Also b+u 2 fc 2 v(i) j c >= b; cjP = bjPg. Hence by (2),  
 must hold. This yields a contradiction. So b+u 2 fc 2 v(i) j c >= b; cjP = bjPg \Par(v(i)).
Since bjP
<
= yjP , we can now dene the desired z
i by zi := b+ u.
By the superadditivity condition the vector a 2 IRD[P with ajD = yjD +
P
i2NnS z
i
jD and
ajP = yjP is an element of v(N ). Using the comprehensiveness of v(N ) and the compactness
assumption on v(N ), it follows in a similar manner as demonstrated above, that the set fc 2
v(N ) j c >= a; cjP = ajPg contains an element b on the Pareto edge of v(N ). Take such a b 2 v(N ).
This b is used to construct an imputation x^ that dominates imputation x via coalition S. Dene
x^ = (x^i)i2N 2 (IR
D[P )N as follows:
x^ijP = bjP for each i 2 N
x^ijD = z
i
jD +
1
jNnSj(b− y −
P
i2NnS z
i)jD for each i 2 N n S
x^ijD = x
i
jD +
1
jSj(y −
P
i2S x
i)jD for each i 2 S
Notice that

P
i2N x^
i
jD = bjD and x^
i
P = bjP for all i 2 N . Since b 2 v(N ), it follows that x^ is an
allocation;
 Since b is on the Pareto edge of v(N ), using the nonlevelness of v(N ) yields that the
allocation x^ cannot be improved upon by the grand coalition N ;
 Since yjD
>
=
P
i2S x
i
jD and bjP = ajP = yjP
>
= x
i
jP for all i 2 S, we have that x^
i >
= x
i for
each player i 2 S. Also, x 2 I(N; v) by assumption. Hence, singleton coalitions fig with
i 2 S cannot improve upon x^;
 Since b >= a; ajD = yjD+
P
i2NnS z
i
jD, and bjP = ajP = yjP
>
= z
i
jP for each i 2 N nS, we have
that x^i >= z
i for each i 2 N n S. Using the nonlevelness of v(i) and the fact that zi lies
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on the Pareto edge of v(i), we derive that singleton coalitions fig with i 2 N n S cannot
improve upon x^.
From the four points above we deduce that x^ 2 I(N; v). Moreover, y 2 v(S);
P
i2S x^
i
jD = yjD,
and x^ijP = bjP = yjP for each i 2 S. Thus, by (1) and the construction of x^: x^
i  xi for
each i 2 S (recall that x^ijP = x^
j
jP for all players i; j). Conclude that x 62 DOC(N; v). Hence,
DOC(N; v)  C(N; v), which completes the proof. 2
4 Axiomatizations of the Core with Converse Consistency
In this section we study some properties of the core and provide several axiomatizations, all based
on the notions of consistency and converse consistency. The consistency principle essentially
means that if the grand coalition of players reaches an agreement, then no subcoalition of
players has an incentive to renegotiate within the subcoalition after giving the players outside it
their part of the solution, because the proposed agreement is also in the solution of the reduced
game played within the subcoalition. The converse consistency axiom requires that a proposed
agreement must be in the solution of a game if for every subcoalition it holds that the restriction
of this agreement to that subcoalition is in the solution of the reduced game. Hence, it provides
information about the solution of a game, given information about the solution of its reduced
games, justifying the name ‘converse’ consistency. The axiomatizations are similar to those of
Peleg (1985, 1986, 1987).
Denition 4.1 Let (N; v) 2 Γ; x 2 A(N; v), and S 2 2N n f;; Ng. The reduced game (S; vxS) of
(N; v) with respect to allocation x and coalition S is the game dened by
vxS(S) = v(N )− ~x(N n S)
vxS(T ) = [QNnS (v(T [Q)− ~x(Q)) for all T 2 2
S n f;; Sg;
where ~x = (~xi)i2N 2 (IR
D[P )N is dened for all i 2 N by
~xik =
(
xik if k 2 D
0 if k 2 P:
The interpretation of the reduced game is as follows. Suppose the group of all players initially
agrees on an allocation x, and the players in N n S withdraw from the decision-making process
taking their agreed-upon share of the private goods with them. Then, if the agents in S recon-
sider, they are facing the game vxS, because in their negotiations they take into account that they
can cooperate with some of the players in N n S as long as those are given their shares of the
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private goods. Note that the players who leave the decision-making process are not guaranteed
anything about the public criteria. Since these criteria are public, their level will ultimately be
determined by the players who still take part in the decision-making process. Hence, players
who leave this process take a risk, but if the solution concept is consistent, then the remaining
players will not change their minds about the initially agreed-upon levels of the public criteria.
This is similar to the treatment of public goods in van den Nouweland et al. (1998).
Let us consider some axioms that are used in the remainder of this section. A solution
concept  on Γ satises:
 One Person Eciency (OPE) if for each game (N; v) 2 Γ with jN j = 1 it holds that
(N; v) = IR(N; v);
 Individual Rationality (IR) if for each game (N; v) 2 Γ it holds that (N; v) 
IR(N; v);
 Inclusion of Imputation Set for two-player Games (II2) if for every two-player
game (N; v) 2 Γ it holds that (N; v)  I(N; v);
 Restricted Nonemptiness (r-NEM) if for each game (N; v) 2 Γ it holds that if
C(N; v) 6= ;, then (N; v) 6= ;;
 Consistency (CONS) if for each game (N; v) 2 Γ it holds that x 2 (N; v) implies
xS 2 (S; v
x
S) for each coalition S 2 2
N n f;; Ng;
 Converse Consistency (COCONS) if for each game (N; v) 2 Γ with jN j  2 and
each allocation x 2 A(N; v) it holds that if xS 2 (S; v
x
S) for each S 2 2
N n f;; Ng, then
x 2 (N; v);
 Converse Consistency for Two-Player Reductions (COCONS2) if for each game
(N; v) 2 Γ with jN j  3 and each allocation x 2 A(N; v) it holds that if xS 2 (S; v
x
S) for
each S 2 2N n f;; Ng with jSj = 2, then x 2 (N; v).
The next proposition states that the core satises all these axioms.
Proposition 4.2 The core satises OPE, IR, II2, r-NEM, CONS, COCONS, and COCONS2.
Proof. It is obvious that the core satises OPE, IR, II2 and r-NEM.
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To prove that the core satises CONS, let (N; v) 2 Γ; x 2 C(N; v), and S 2 2N n f;; Ng.
Suppose that xS 62 C(S; vxS). Then there exist a coalition T 2 2
S n f;g and a vector z 2 vxS(T )
such that P
i2T x
i
jD
<
= zjD
xijP
<
= zjP for all i 2 T
with at least one strict inequality (). Since z 2 vxS(T ), there exist a Q  N nS and y 2 v(T [Q)
such that z = y − ~x(Q). Observe that by denition of the reduced game, Q = N n S if T = S.
Now we haveP
i2T[Q x
i
jD =
P
i2T x
i
jD +
P
i2Q ~x
i
jD
<
= (z + ~x(Q))jD = yjD
xijP
<
= zjP = (y − ~x(Q))jP = yjP for all i 2 T [Q
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). But then x cannot be in the core of (N; v),
since T [Q can improve upon it. Hence xS 2 C(S; v
x
S) and the core satises CONS.
To prove that the core satises COCONS2, Let (N; v) 2 Γ with jN j  3 and x 2 A(N; v)
such that xS 2 C(S; vxS) for every two-player coalition S 2 2
N n f;; Ng. We will prove that no
coalition of players can improve upon x, and hence x 2 C(N; v).
Suppose that N can improve upon x. Then, for some y 2 v(N ):P
i2N x
i
jD
<
= yjD
xijP
<
= yjP for all i 2 N
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). Let S 2 2N n f;; Ng have two players. Then,
for a y as mentioned above it holds thatP
i2S x
i
jD
<
= yjD −
P
i2NnS x
i
jD = (y− ~x(N n S))jD
xijP
<
= yjP = (y − ~x(N n S))jP for all i 2 S
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). Since y − ~x(N n S) 2 vxS(S), we nd that S
can improve upon xS in (S; v
x
S). This contradicts xS 2 C(S; v
x
S). We conclude that N cannot
improve upon x in (N; v).
Now, let T 2 2N n f;; Ng. To prove that T cannot improve upon x in (N; v), let i 2 T; j 2
N n T , and S := fi; jg. Then xS 2 C(S; vxS), so in particular fig cannot improve upon xS in
(S; vxS). Consequently, for T n fig  N nS, there is no z 2 v((T n fig)[fig)− ~x(T n fig)  v
x
S(i)
such that xijD
<
= zjD and x
i
jP
<
= zjP , where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). So there
is no y 2 v(T ) such thatP
k2T x
k
jD = x
i
jD +
P
k2T nfig x
k
jD
<
= yjD
xkjP
<
= yjP for all k 2 T
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where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). Consequently, T cannot improve upon x on
(N; v).
We conclude that x 2 C(N; v) and that the core satises COCONS2.
Notice that COCONS is not implied by COCONS2, since COCONS2 is not applicable to
games (N; v) 2 Γ with jN j = 2. The proof that the core satises COCONS, however, is similar
to the proof that it satises COCONS2 and is therefore omitted. 2
Our next proposition lays the basis for the rst axiomatization of the core.
Proposition 4.3 Let  and  be two solution concepts on Γ. If  satises OPE and CONS
and  satises OPE and COCONS, then (N; v)   (N; v) for each game (N; v) 2 Γ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of players. First, let (N; v) 2 Γ have only
one player. Then (N; v) =  (N; v) by OPE. Next, assume that the claim holds for each game
with at most n 2 IN players and let (N; v) 2 Γ have n + 1 players. Let x 2 (N; v). By CONS
of : xS 2 (S; v
x
S) for every S 2 2
N n f;; Ng. By induction (S; vxS)   (S; v
x
S) for every
S 2 2N n f;; Ng. Using COCONS of  we obtain x 2  (N; v). 2
Applying this proposition twice gives us the following axiomatization of the core.
Theorem 4.4 A solution concept  on Γ satises OPE, CONS, and COCONS, if and only if
 is the core.
Proof. The core satises the three axioms according to proposition 4.2. Let  be a solution
concept on Γ that also satises the axioms. Now apply proposition 4.3. Since  satises OPE
and CONS and the core satises OPE and COCONS, we nd that (N; v)  C(N; v) for each
(N; v) 2 Γ. Since the core satises OPE and CONS and  satises OPE and COCONS, we nd
that C(N; v)  (N; v) for each (N; v) 2 Γ. Hence, (N; v) = C(N; v) for all (N; v) 2 Γ. 2
According to our next result, if a solution concept  on Γ satises individual rationality and
consistency, then it is included in the core.
Proposition 4.5 Let  be a solution concept on Γ that satises IR and CONS. Then (N; v)
C(N; v) for each game (N; v) 2 Γ.
Proof. Let (N; v) 2 Γ. We discern three cases.
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 If jN j = 1, then (N; v)  IR(N; v) = C(N; v) by IR of ;
 If jN j = 2, let x 2 (N; v). Individual players cannot improve upon x by IR of . It
remains to show that N cannot improve upon x. Suppose to the contrary that N can
improve upon x. Then there exists a vector y 2 v(N ) such thatP
i2N x
i
jD
<
= yjD
xijP
<
= yjP for all i 2 N
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). Let i 2 N . Then
xijD
<
= yjD −
P
j2Nnfig x
j
jD = (y − ~x(N n fig))jD
xijP
<
= yjP = (y − ~x(N n fig))jP
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (). Since y−~x(N nfig) 2 v(N )−~x(N nfig) =
vxfig(i), it follows that x
i 62 IR(fig; vxfig). By IR of , x
i 62 (fig; vxfig). But x 2 (N; v)
and CONS of  imply that xi 2 (fig; vxfig), a contradiction. Hence, one has to conclude
that N cannot improve upon x in (N; v).
This leads to the conclusion that (N; v) C(N; v) for two-player games (N; v) 2 Γ;
 If jN j  3, let x 2 (N; v). By CONS of , xS 2 (S; vxS) for each S 2 2
N n f;g with
jSj = 2. By the previous step, (S; vxS)  C(S; v
x
S) for such two-player coalitions S. Using
COCONS2 of the core, it follows that x 2 C(N; v). 2
In the part of the proof of proposition 4.5 where we indicate that the grand coalition N in a
two-player game (N; v) cannot improve upon an allocation x 2 (N; v) the use of summation
signs and notations like N n fig seems unnecessarily complicated, since N n fig consists of only
one player. We adopt the more general notation, however, because with this notation it is easily
seen that it also proves that the grand coalition cannot improve upon an allocation x 2 (N; v)
in games with an arbitrary number of players.
Our next axiomatization applies the converse consistency axiom for two-player reductions.
Theorem 4.6 A solution concept  on Γ satises IR, II2, CONS, and COCONS2 if and only
if  is the core.
Proof. The core satises the four axioms by proposition 4.2. Let  be a solution concept on Γ
that also satises the axioms. Proposition 4.5 shows that (N; v)  C(N; v) for every (N; v) 2 Γ.
14
It remains to show that C(N; v)  (N; v) for each (N; v) 2 Γ. We consider three separate
cases in which the game has one, two, or more than two players. First we consider two-player
games, since this result is required for the argumentation in one-player games.
 If jN j = 2, we know that (N; v) C(N; v) from proposition 4.5 and C(N; v) = I(N; v)
(N; v) by II2 of . So C(N; v) = (N; v);
 Consider a one player game (fig; v) and let xi 2 C(fig; v). Consider j 2 U n fig and the
game (fi; jg; w) 2 Γ dened by w(i) = w(fi; jg) = v(i) and w(j) = fag with ajD = 0 and
ajP = x
i
jP . Denote the allocation in (fi; jg; w) 2 Γ which gives x
i to player i and a to
player j by (xi; a). Then (xi; a) 2 C(fi; jg; w) = (fi; jg; w). Also, (fig; w(x
i;a)
fig ) = (fig; v),
since w
(xi;a)
fig (i) = w(fi; jg)− ~a = v(i). By CONS of , x
i 2 (fig; w
(xi;a)
fig ) = (fig; v).
Hence, C(N; v)  (N; v) if jN j = 1;
 If jN j  3, let x 2 C(N; v). By CONS of the core: xS 2 C(S; vxS) = (S; v
x
S) whenever
jSj = 2, hence x 2 (N; v) by COCONS2 of .
We conclude that (N; v) = C(N; v) for all games (N; v) 2 Γ. 2
5 An Axiomatization of the Core with Enlightening
In the proofs of theorems 4.4 and proposition 4.5, we showed that a solution concept  on Γ
satises (N; v) C(N; v) for each game (N; v) 2 Γ by assuming that  satises consistency and
some form of individual rationality or one person eciency, i.e, an assumption that focusses on
individual players. The other inclusion, C(N; v)  (N; v) was harder to prove. In the previous
section two notions of converse consistency were used to establish this part. In the article of Peleg
(1985) on an axiomatization of the core of NTU games, it was shown that | given an innite
set of potential agents from which the nite player sets are drawn | the converse consistency
axiom can be replaced by a (restricted) nonemptiness axiom to establish inclusion of the core in
. The same is observed in axiomatizations of equilibria in noncooperative games (cf. Peleg and
Tijs (1996) and Norde et al. (1996)), where properties like restricted nonemptiness, individual
rationality, consistency and converse consistency are studied in a dierent set-up. Peleg and Tijs
(1996) prove that if a solution concept on a set of noncooperative games satises consistency and
a requirement on single player games, it is a subset of the Nash equilibrium set. If, in addition,
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a converse consistency property is imposed, the solution concept coincides with the set of Nash
equilibria. Norde et al. (1996) show that in mixed extensions of nite noncooperative games
converse consistency can be replaced by nonemptiness.
In the current section we slightly modify the denition of reduced games of the previous
section and show that the core can be axiomatized by means of restricted nonemptiness, con-
sistency with respect to the new type of reduced games, and individual rationality. A similar
denition of reduced games is used in Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1997) to provide a
new axiomatization of the core for games with transferable utility.
The section concludes with an example showing that converse consistency cannot be replaced
with restricted nonemptiness if the denition of reduced games from section 4 is used.
Denition 5.1 Let (N; v) 2 Γ; x 2 A(N; v), and S 2 2N n f;; Ng. The reduced game (S; vxS) of
(N; v) with respect to allocation x and coalition S is the game dened by:
vxS(S) = v(N )− ~x(N n S)
vxS(T ) = [QNnS;Q 6=; (v(T [Q)− ~x(Q)) for all T 2 2
S n f;; Sg:
The dierence between this denition of a reduced game and the one in denition 4.1 is that we
require the set Q in the specication of vxS(T ) to be nonempty. This reflects the intuition that,
although attention is restricted to the players in S, the players in N n S do not leave the game,
but strongly influence the game from behind the scenes. The remaining players don’t ignore
those in N n S, but always cooperate with at least some of them.
With the reduction as given in denition 5.1, we obtain a new consistency axiom CONS. A
solution concept  on Γ satises:
 CONS if for each game (N; v) 2 Γ it holds that x 2 (N; v) implies xS 2 (S; v
x
S) for
each coalition S 2 2N n f;; Ng.
The core satises CONS. This is shown in the following proposition, along with other statements
concerning the core and CONS.
Proposition 5.2 The following claims are true:
1. The core satises CONS;
2. Consider a game (N; v) 2 Γ with jN j  3. If x 2 IR(N; v) and xS 2 C(S; v
x
S) for each
S 2 2N n f;; Ng with jSj = 2, then x 2 C(N; v);
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3. Let  be a solution concept on Γ that satises IR and CONS. Then (N; v) C(N; v) for
each (N; v) 2 Γ.
Proof.
1. The proof that the core satises CONS is similar to the proof that the core satises
consistency in proposition 4.2;
2. Suppose x 2 IR(N; v) and xS 2 C(S; vxS) for each S 2 2
N n f;; Ng with jSj = 2. Then
individual players cannot improve upon x because x 2 IR(N; v). To show that N and
other coalitions T 2 2N with jT j  2 cannot improve upon x, apply the arguments used
in the proof that the core satises COCONS2 in proposition 4.2;
3. Let (N; v) 2 Γ. The proof that (N; v)  C(N; v) if jN j 2 f1; 2g is completely analogous
to the corresponding part of the proof of proposition 4.5. If jN j  3, let x 2 (N; v). By
CONS of , xS 2 (S; v
x
S) for each S 2 2
N nf;; Ng with jSj = 2. Hence, using the previous
step of this proof, we nd that xS 2 C(S; vxS) for each S 2 2
N n f;; Ng with jN j = 2. By
IR of , x 2 (N; v)  IR(N; v). Then, by part 2 of the current proposition, it follows
that x 2 C(N; v). 2
The main result of this section is the following axiomatization of the core.
Theorem 5.3 A solution concept  on Γ satises IR, CONS, and r-NEM if and only if  is
the core.
Proof. We have already seen that the core satises the three axioms. Let  be a solution
concept on Γ that also satises the three axioms. From Proposition 5.2, part 3, we know that
(N; v)  C(N; v) for each (N; v) 2 Γ. It remains to show that C(N; v)  (N; v) for each
(N; v) 2 Γ.
Let (N; v) 2 Γ. If C(N; v) = ; we are done, so assume C(N; v) 6= ;, and let x = (xi)i2N 2
C(N; v). Also, let n 2 U nN and dene a game (N [ fng; w) 2 Γ as follows:
w(n) = fy 2 IRD[P j there exists a k 2 D s.t. yk < 0g
[ fy 2 IRD[P j there exists a k 2 P s.t. yk < x
i
kg
w(i) = fy 2 IRD[P j there exists a k 2 D [ P s.t. yk < xikg for i 2 N
w(S [ fng) = v(S) for S  N; S 6= ;
w(S) = v(S) for S  N; jSj  2:
17
(Recall that for public criteria k 2 P one has that xik = x
j
k for all players i; j 2 N . Consequently,
it does not matter which player i 2 N is chosen in the denition of w(n) above.)
We show that C(N [ fng; w) = f(x; d)g, where (x; d) is the allocation that gives xi 2 IRD[P
to each player i 2 N and d 2 IRD[P to player n, with djD = 0 and djP = x
i
jP (for arbitrary i 2 N ,
as above). Obviously, (x; d) 2 C(N [ fng; w). Now, let (bi)i2N  fbng 2 C(N [ fng; w). Using
the denitions of (w(j))j2N[fng, we see that it must hold that b
i >
= x
i for each player i 2 N and
bn >= d, to make sure that individual players in N [ fng cannot improve upon (bi)i2N fbng. If
one or more of these inequalities are strict, thenP
i2N[fng b
i
jD
>
=
P
i2N x
i
jD + djD =
P
i2N x
i
jD
bijP
>
= x
i
jP for each player i 2 N [ fng;
with at least one strict inequality. This would contradict (x; d) 2 C(N [ fng; w). Hence,
(bi)i2N = (x
i)i2N and b
n = d and this proves that (x; d) is the unique core element of (N[fng; w).
Also, we claim that (N;w
(x;d)
N ) = (N; v). Namely,
w
(x;d)
N (N ) = w(N [ fng)−
~d = w(N [ fng)− 0 = v(N )
w
(x;d)
N (S) = w(S [ fng)−
~d = w(S [ fng)− 0 = v(S) for S 62 f;; Ng:
By r-NEM of  we know that (N [ fng; w) 6= ; and we already saw that (N [ fng) 
C(N [ fng; w) = f(x; d)g. So, (N [ fng; w) = f(x; d)g. Hence, by CONS of : x = (x; d)N 2
(N;w
(x;d)
N ) = (N; v). This proves that C(N; v)  (N; v), nishing our proof. 2
The main step in the proof, showing that C(N; v)  (N; v) for each game (N; v) 2 Γ, proceeds
by ‘enlightening’ core elements. In this procedure, one considers a game with a nonempty
core and an arbitrary allocation in this core. Then, a game is constructed with a player set
that strictly includes the players of the original game in such a way that this larger game has a
unique core element and such that this new, enlarged, game and its unique core element reduced
to the original player set are the original game and core element. Restricted nonemptiness is
then used to derive the desired inclusion.
We conclude by showing that the analogon of theorem 5.3 does not hold if we replace CONS
by consistency with respect to the old denition of reduced games. In particular, we construct
a solution concept  on Γ that satises IR, CONS, and r-NEM, which is not equal to the core.
Let T  Γ be the class of games with a nonempty core, one divisible criterion, and zero
public criteria:
T := f(N; v) 2 Γ j C(N; v) 6= ;; jDj = 1; P = ;g:
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Since for each game (N; v) 2 T the core is nonempty, there is only one criterion, and v takes
nonempty values (see section 2), we conclude that the function v is bounded from above. Hence,
the function sup v, where sup v(S) is the supremum of v(S) for each S 2 2N nf;g, is well-dened.
Dene a solution concept  on Γ as follows:
(N; v) =
(
C(N; v) if (N; v) 62 T
fNu(N; supv)g; the nucleolus of (N; sup v) if (N; v) 2 T
If (N; v) 2 T , then C(N; v) = C(N; sup v). The game (N; sup v) is a TU-game. Recall (cf.
Schmeidler (1969)) that the nucleolus of a TU-game with a nonempty core is always included
in the core. The solution concept  satises r-NEM because the nucleolus exists for TU-games.
To prove IR of , we distinguish between (N; v) 2 T and (N; v) 62 T . If (N; v) 62 T , it is clear
that (N; v) = C(N; v)  IR(N; v) by IR of the core. If (N; v) 2 T , then C(N; v) = C(N; sup v).
Consequently,
(N; v) = fNu(N; supv)g  C(N; sup v) = C(N; v)  IR(N; v)
by IR of the core and inclusion of the nucleolus in the core if the core of a TU-game is nonempty
(Schmeidler (1969)).
The solution concept  also satises CONS. If (N; v) 62 T , then (S; vxS) 62 T for each x 2
A(N; v) and S 2 2N n f;; Ng and hence it follows from consistency of the core that xS 2
(S; vxS) for each x 2 (N; v) and S 2 2
N n f;; Ng. So, suppose (N; v) 2 T , so that (N; v) =
fNu(N; supv)g. Let S 2 2N n f;; Ng and x 2 (N; v), i.e., x = Nu(N; supv).
Notice, rst of all, that the reduced game (S; vxS) is again an element of T . It is clear
that the reduced game has no public and exactly one private criterion. Also, x 2 (N; v) =
fNu(N; supv)g  C(N; sup v) = C(N; v) and the core satises CONS. This shows that xS 2
C(S; vxS) and, hence, C(S; v
x
S) 6= ;.
We know by consistency of the nucleolus for TU-games (cf. Peleg (1986)) that xS is the
nucleolus of (S; w), where the reduced game w is dened by
w(S) = (sup v)(N )− x(N n S)
w(T ) = maxQNnSf(sup v)(T [Q)− x(Q)g for T 2 2
S n f;; Sg:
Notice that
w(S) = (sup v)(N )− x(N n S)
= sup(v(N )− x(N n S))
= sup vxS(S);
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and for T 2 2S n f;; Sg:
w(T ) = max
QNnS
f(supv)(T [Q)− x(Q)g
= max
QNnS
fsup(v(T [Q)− x(Q))g
= sup[QNnSfv(T [Q)− x(Q)g
= sup vxS(T ):
So xS = Nu(S; w) = Nu(S; sup v
x
S) 2 (S; v
x
S), completing our proof that  satises CONS.
To show that  6= C, consider the two-player game (f1; 2g; v) 2 T with v(1) = v(2) = f0g
and v(f1; 2g) = f1g. Then (f1; 2g; v) = fNu(f1; 2g; v)g= f( 12 ;
1
2)g 6= C(f1; 2g; v) = f(x
1; x2) 2
IR2 j x1  0; x2  0; x1 + x2 = 1g.
As an aside, notice that the solution concept  also satises OPE. This follows from OPE
of the core and (N; v) = C(N; v) if jN j = 1. This implies that in theorem 4.4 the converse
consistency axiom cannot be replaced by restricted nonemptiness and individual rationality.
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